



# PRESS RELEASE

## House National Security Committee Subcommittee on Military Personnel Stephen E. Buyer, Chairman

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**  
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**CHAIRMAN BUYER — OPENING REMARKS**  
**MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING**  
**IMPLICATIONS OF THE QDR AND NDP**  
**FOR**  
**PERSONNEL, FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE TOTAL FORCE**

*January 29, 1998*

The subcommittee meets today to review and assess the findings and recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP).

To that end, we look to the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Defense Panel, and the military services to provide:

- An overview and summary of the principal QDR and NDP recommendations that most directly impact conventional-force missions, force structure, end strength, and personnel of the Total Force, and the availability and adequacy of resources to support those recommendations.
- A discussion of the rationale behind those recommendations, and the risks and trade-offs attendant to DOD and military service decisions to implement specific QDR and NDP recommendations.
- An assessment of the feasibility of implementing the recommendations given the strong competition among competing national military priorities in resource constrained environment.
- The DOD and service-specific schedule of implementation of the QDR and applicable NDP recommendations.

This hearing is unusual in several respects.

First, the focus of this hearing is broader than that normally undertaken by the subcommittee. However, because I believe that the QDR and the NDP represent substantially different options to transform our military forces to meet the national security strategy needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, it is essential that we understand the full context and import of both of these studies – the big picture, so to speak — before we under-

take the process of deciding military personnel and force structure issues in the fiscal year 1999 and future defense budgets.

Second, whether Congress heeds the recommendations of the QDR, the NDP or a combination of both, there are risks, even grave risks, attendant upon the various courses of action that might be adopted. We must understand those risks before we can make informed judgments about the future. Of major concern to this subcommittee is that if the resource strategies envisioned by both the QDR and NDP fail to provide the funding necessary to transform and modernize future military forces, personnel and force structure could become the “bill-payers” of choice. Such a choice, I argue, would put this nation’s military forces and strategy at grave risk. How great is the risk that the QDR resourcing strategy will not achieve its objectives? The NDP concluded that the QDR resourcing strategy was at risk. I hope to understand more today about that risk and others.

Finally, the complexities of the changes proposed by both the QDR and the NDP cut across the entire breadth and depth of the Defense Department. For that reason, I believe it is necessary to hear the service-specific perspectives – active and reserve component. To do that requires more witness panels than we would normally like to have during a single hearing. However, I hope by the end of the hearing, to have a fuller understanding of the QDR and NDP implications for the Total Force.